Under the Federal Arbitration Act, there is a presumption in favor of arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (the stay of proceedings concerning a matter for which the parties have previously agreed to conciliation). Because of the “strong federal policy in favor of arbitration,” a court should “raise all doubts about the parties` intentions in favor of arbitration.” Albert M. Higley Co. v. N/S Corp., 445 F.3d 861, 863 (6th Cir. 2006). “The federal policy in favor of arbitration is not absolute.” A court should clarify “doubts about the extent of arbitration matters.” In favour of arbitration, whether it is the problem at issue, the construction of the agreement itself or an accusation of renunciation, delay or similar defence against arbitration. Javitch v.
First Union Sec, Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2003) (cited as Moses H. Cone Mem`l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)). To grant a request for forced settlement, a court must conclude that “the dispute is subject to arbitration.” Landis v.
Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 561 (6 cir. 2008). The examination of arbitration capacity consists of two studies: (1) whether “an arbitration agreement is valid between the parties” and (2) whether “the specific dispute falls within the material scope of the agreement”. This dispute is not covered by the exception in section 15.4 for disputes relating exclusively to the right or entitlement to benefits arising from the contract. The current dispute concerns whether the agreement, plan and manual can be interpreted in such a way that the prescription drug plan described in the manual can be replaced by Medicare Part D for all participants in the medical plan 2. Therefore, the agreement and the established precedent gave the District Court jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement/approval decree through the use of an appropriate remedy, and we are verifying the District Court`s order of September 2011 in the form of a misuse of authority. Current retiree health insurance is subject to the parameters of an agreement known as the Shy Agreement, which was the result of a lawsuit filed against the company by a group of UAW members, which included lead plaintiff Arthur Shy, a member of UAW Local 402. The class action plaintiffs (“Shy Class”) commenced the summary proceedings against Navistar International Corp. (“Navistar”) sought and asserted that Navistar`s unilateral move to replace Medicare Part D in its medical plan was contrary to the settlement agreement entered into by the parties in 1993 (the “Agreement”). The District Court found that Navistar`s actions were contrary to the agreement and warned Navistar to retroactively reinstate the prescription drug service in effect prior to Navistar`s unilateral substitution. The factual jurisdiction of the District Court is well established. Courts “have a duty to enforce their orders of approval based on the circumstances.” Waste Mgmt.
of Ohio, City of Dayton, 132 F.3d 1142, 1146 (6 cir.1997); see also United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir.1995) (“[A] The approval order is an order of the Tribunal and, therefore, naturally leaves the Tribunal reasonable discretion to enforce the obligations imposed on the parties.”); Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir.1983) (“A decree of approval is essentially a settlement agreement subject to further judicial review”.). . . .